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Introduction 
This chapter explores the institutional conditions for the development of 
financial markets in emerging markets and transition economies. We focus on 
the development of the legal and regulatory framework for stock markets, but 
suggest that our framework would also be applicable to the law governing 
credit markets and banking institutions. Given the importance of financial 
markets for economic growth and development (McKinnon 1973), efforts to 
promote the development of such markets has been a corner stone of economic 
policies in transition economies. Not all countries, however, have been equally 
successful in creating sustainable financial markets. This is true even for 
countries that have followed blueprints of what are widely regarded best 
practices for governing financial markets. This chapter offers an explanation for 
why this may be the case.  
 We start from the premise that law is intrinsically incomplete, which 
implies that it is impossible to write a law that can unambiguously specify all 
potentially harmful actions. Because law is incomplete, law enforcement by 
courts may not always effectively deter violations. Rather than attempting the 
impossible task of completing the law, the effectiveness of law enforcement 
may be enhanced by reallocating lawmaking and law enforcement powers 
(LMLEP). In earlier work we showed that when law is highly incomplete and 
violations of the law may result in substantial harm, it is optimal to allocate law 
enforcement rights to regulators rather than courts (Pistor and Xu in press; Xu 
and Pistor 2003).  
Similar solutions, which worked reasonably well in developed market 
economies with a long history of commercial law development, may, however, 
not work in transition economies. The reason is that transition economies face 
conditions that render enforcement by courts and regulators both ineffective. 
We identify two key conditions that undermine classic forms of law 
enforcement that have been tried and tested in developed market economies: the 
level of incomplete law, and the absence of reliable information. Transition 
economies have engaged in wholesale reforms of their legal systems. The scope 
and meaning of newly enacted laws, however, is difficult to discern from 
statutory law alone. Due to language, cultural and institutional differences case 
law from other countries that may help interpret the law is not easily 
transferable. Countries that transplant law from elsewhere, therefore, have little 
 or no access to interpretative sources, which makes transplanted laws further 
incomplete. Only after a substantial body of domestic case law has been 
developed will individuals as well as law enforcers know the reach and limits of 
the new law.  
The more incomplete the law, the weaker its deterrence effect, as the 
uncertainties about the scope and meaning of law increase with higher levels of 
incompleteness. Moreover, courts in transition economies often lack capacity 
and experience to address new legal problems effectively, which aggravates the 
problem of incomplete law. Attempts to improve law enforcement by 
introducing a regulator may not work, primarily because effective regulation 
depends heavily on reliable information. Companies in transition economies 
face substantial problems in bringing previous accounting data, which were 
compiled on the basis of socialist accounting principles, in line with new 
accounting standards. Even when they do so, substantial concerns remain as to 
how accurately these new books reflect the intrinsic value of the firm. 
Moreover, the uncertainties that surround the conversion of accounting data 
creates possibilities for manipulation. As a result, the information that 
regulators obtain is much noisier than is the case in developed market 
economies. Over time information may become more reliable and 
intermediaries may enter the market that can help verify information--but 
before then, law enforcement by regulators will be ineffective and may even 
result in regulatory failure. Transition economies therefore face a fundamental 
 dilemma. They need to develop financial markets, and yet they lack the 
ingredients it takes to do so. Worst, recipes for law enforcement that have 
historically worked elsewhere may not help in the short to medium term. Unlike 
developed economies where extensive commercial law existed at the time 
financial markets emerged, in transition economies and newly emerging 
markets, law, legal institutions, and markets need to be created simultaneously.  
An alternative strategy for transition economies is to use measures 
beyond law enforcement to initiate market development. This chapter suggests 
that an important strategy may be to access insiders’ knowledge of a company’s 
potential. This strategy is bound to be less transparent and raises concerns about 
the accountability of agents charged with selecting companies. Still, these 
problems can be controlled by ensuring that decisions are taken collectively and 
by allocating liability for wrongful decisions to those who participate in the 
selection process. If such checks are in place, measures beyond law 
enforcement may be less prone to corruption and regulatory capture than 
standard law enforcement strategies. The reason is that the same factors that 
render standard law enforcement strategies ineffective in transition economies, 
that is, highly incomplete law and low quality information, also give law 
enforcement agents ample room for discretion, which can be easily misused. 
Paradoxically, the appearance of standard law enforcement institutions and 
practices may disguise the fact that given the underlying problems of 
incomplete law and information problems, they broaden rather than reduce the 
 scope for corruption. By contrast, processes that may appear to be prone to 
corrupt practices, may be less vulnerable to misuse as long as other 
mechanisms, such as multiparty decision making and competition, are in place 
to reduce the possible scope of misuse. 
We use the experience of China and Russia to exemplify two different 
strategies in trying to jump start financial market development. In both 
countries the process started in the early 1990s. Russia began the process of 
financial market development by privatizing thousands of companies and 
distributing their shares to the public. At the time, courts were the only 
enforcement agents. By 1994 a securities commission was established. Its 
powers were limited at the beginning but expanded over time. Available data 
suggest that both courts and regulators have been quite active in enforcing the 
law. Financial market development in Russia has, however, been slow. Most of 
the companies that were privatized in the early 1990s have never been traded. 
The market is dominated by companies trading in oil, mining, and energy, that 
is, companies where the underlying assets are sufficiently valuable to balance 
concerns about lack of information and reliable governance structures. In fact, 
stocks of listed companies move together, suggesting that investors pay little 
attention to firm-specific information.  
In China, by contrast, virtually all of the companies that are listed are 
partly state-owned. The legal framework developed in the early 1990s 
established an elaborate merit system for companies wishing to issue shares to 
 the public. This system was, however, replaced by a quota system. Under the 
quota system, a certain volume of funds to be raised by state-owned enterprises 
in the form of equity was allotted to regions and or ministries, which in turn 
were responsible for selecting the companies for this program. Given the 
increasing scarcity of bank loans, access to the equity markets was attractive to 
companies. The risk of bad decisions was borne not only by investors, but also 
by agents responsible for selecting companies, because they were forced to bail 
out companies that failed on the market and faced lower quotas in the future. 
The number of listed companies in China today is much higher than in Russia. 
Manufacturing companies dominate the market. Most strikingly, increasingly 
independent stock movements of listed companies suggest that more firm-
specific information may be available to investors.  
We recognize that incomplete law and information problems may not be 
the only factors that explain the divergent experiences of Russia and China in 
developing financial markets. The goal of this chapter is to offer a theory that 
helps explain why standard enforcement practices work less well in transition 
economies. We suggest that the evidence we present from Russia and China is 
consistent with our theory, but we do not claim that we can fully rule out other 
explanations. 
 
Law Enforcement under Incomplete Law 
 In earlier work we developed the theory of incomplete law (Pistor and Xu in 
press). We argued that law is intrinsically incomplete. Even the best, social 
welfare maximizing, lawmaker cannot write law that is fully complete, because 
lawmakers cannot foresee all future contingencies. A lawmaker (court, 
legislature, etc.) may choose to write a relatively more or less complete law, but 
fundamentally cannot escape the problem that even the best efforts will render 
the law incomplete. Given that law is incomplete, the power to address future 
contingencies, that is, the residual LMLEP have to be allocated to maintain 
effective law enforcement. Although this will not result in full deterrence (after 
all, law remains incomplete), law enforcement can be enhanced. 
If law were complete, that is, if a law could stipulate unambiguously all 
future contingencies, law could fully deter harmful actions. The key task for 
such a law would be to stipulate the appropriate level of punishment. Existing 
theories predict that a rational individual with a full knowledge of the--
complete--law will not violate the law. Indeed, much of the traditional literature 
on law enforcement (Becker 1968; Stigler 1970; Polinsky and Shavell 2000) 
focuses on the appropriate level of punishment and treats law implicitly as 
complete. By contrast, if law is incomplete, law cannot effectively deter. We 
argue that in this second best world of incomplete law, legal systems need to 
allocate LMLEP to deal with future contingencies that were unanticipated at the 
time the law was made in order to enhance the effectiveness of law 
enforcement. In the absence of the allocation of LMLEP, many actions will not 
 be sanctioned, even if they result in substantial harm. Legislative change may 
make law more complete after assembling sufficient expertise, but this will take 
effect only in the future. Moreover, new actions or factual situations the revised 
law did not contemplate will undoubtedly arise, leaving it once more 
incomplete. 
Given that law is incomplete, a crucial question is who should hold the 
power to interpret and/or adapt law in light of new circumstances. We argue 
that the allocation of LMLEP should be related to the lawmaking and law 
enforcement functions that different agents perform. In what follows, we 
attribute particular functions to different agents, which are admittedly stylized, 
but closely resemble the functions such agents perform in developed market 
economies. Legislatures are agents that make law ex ante, but typically do not 
exercise any law enforcement powers. Courts usually make law ex post, that is, 
after the critical facts of a case have been revealed. However, case law once 
made also has ex ante implications for actions taken in the future. Courts also 
exercise law enforcement powers. More importantly, courts enforce law only 
after a party other than the court brings an action. This party may be the victim, 
or it may be a state agent, such as a prosecutor or administrative agency. We 
therefore call courts reactive as opposed to proactive law enforcers. This design 
feature is crucial for courts to function as neutral arbiters. 
Regulators also combine lawmaking and law enforcement functions. 
Just as legislatures, they make law ex ante. Unlike legislatures, regulators are 
 typically vested only with limited lawmaking powers defined by certain 
activities or sectors, but within the scope of their lawmaking powers, they can 
change the law more flexibly and with fewer procedural requirements. This 
allows them to be more responsive to socioeconomic or technological change 
than legislatures. However, a similar function could be achieved by setting up a 
special parliamentary committee to deal with a specialized area of the law. The 
distinctive feature of regulators thus lies not in greater flexibility and/or greater 
expertise as compared with legislatures, but in combining lawmaking with 
proactive law enforcement. In contrast to courts, regulators can take the 
initiative and launch an investigation, enjoin actions, or impose fines, and do 
not have to wait for others to bring such actions. These particular features make 
regulators potentially very powerful law enforcers. The very same features raise 
concerns, as regulators may misuse these powers and suppress potentially 
beneficial actions or even engage in rent-seeking activities. To optimize law 
enforcement it is therefore important to identify the conditions under which the 
benefits of regulators outweigh their potential costs.  
When law is highly complete, law enforcement by courts in a reactive 
fashion has sufficient deterrence effect. By contrast, when law is incomplete it 
may be better to reallocate LMLEP to different agents. The optimal allocation 
of LMLEP is determined by many factors, including the level of expected harm 
and the cost of standardizing actions, which is crucial for regulators to enforce 
law effectively (for details of the analysis see Xu and Pistor 2003).1 When firms 
 come to the market, investors face a lemons problem (Akerlof 1970). Incidents 
of misrepresentation of information may seriously discourage investments in 
shares as is evidenced by market crashes in response to the revelation of stock 
fraud schemes or systemic misrepresentation in financial statements--as most 
recently demonstrated by the market response to the discovery of financial 
misreporting at Enron, Worldcom, and so on. Thus the expected degree of 
harm--undermining the functioning of securities market--is high. Agents that 
can enjoin actions before harm has been done, are therefore of critical 
importance. Theoretically, courts may also enjoin actions before harm has been 
done. They can do this, however, only after an action has been brought by 
someone else, such as a current shareholder or potential investor, who needs the 
right incentives to launch a lawsuit at the right time. By contrast, regulators can 
initiate enforcement procedures on their own and do not need to wait for others 
to bring action. Disclosure rules for financial markets can be standardized at 
reasonable costs. Lawmakers can define the type of information that must be 
disclosed, and adapt these rules over time as market behavior changes or as it 
becomes apparent that investors require different information. Giving regulators 
this power ensures that disclosure rules will be adopted faster and more flexibly 
than leaving this task with legislatures. Moreover, regulators can use their 
expertise from law enforcement to decide on the need for further lawmaking 
activities. 
 In sum, under incomplete law legal systems that rely exclusively on 
reactive law enforcement by courts may experience deterrence failure and 
allocating LMLEP to regulators may be superior. The efficacy of regulators, 
however, hinges on their ability to rely on firm-specific information that can be 
standardized at relatively low cost. As we will show in the next section, if 
standardized information is not available or not reliable, legal systems and 
markets may suffer from regulatory failure. Therefore, alternative governance 
mechanisms may be needed. 
 
Deterrence and Regulatory Failure in Transition Economies 
In transition economies, the incompleteness of law problem and the information 
problem are both more severe than in developed market economies. Given the 
scale and scope of economic and legal reforms that are taking place 
concurrently, law in transition countries is bound to be highly incomplete, that 
is, its meaning and application to specific cases is largely untested and the 
scope of liability is therefore uncertain. As a result, court enforcement cannot 
effectively deter violations. The intuition for this argument, which we formalize 
in related work (Xu and Pistor 2003) is the following: Deterrence is said to 
work effectively, if the level of expected punishment is sufficiently high 
(Becker 1968). The Becker model is based on an implicit assumption that law is 
complete and that individuals refrain from carrying out harmful actions as long 
as the expected punishment is sufficiently high, because they know 
 unambiguously the expected punishment for all possible harmful actions. 
Arguably, the problem of incomplete law is even more severe in transition 
economies than at the outset of financial market development in the West. 
When England’s stock market soared in the nineteenth century during the 
railway mania, there were no securities laws or regulators that would monitor 
the amount or type of information companies disclosed when issuing shares to 
the public. But there was a highly developed contract and tort law at hand. 
Although the principles of the law had been developed with different cases in 
mind, a sufficiently large body of case law was available to determine how 
these principles should be applied to the newly arising securities fraud and 
misrepresentation of information cases. Moreover, courts had experience with 
handling matters of a commercial nature and with adapting law over time in 
response to new fact patterns. Although court enforcement ultimately proved to 
be insufficient for dealing with the problem of law enforcement in securities 
matters, courts nevertheless played an important role in advancing legal 
standards to deal with stock fraud schemes and imposing civil and criminal 
liability. Moreover, the legislature closely observed case law and readily 
intervened whenever it saw reasons to fill gaps left by the courts or to correct 
decisions made by them. 
By contrast, Russia or China did not have much of a commercial law at 
the outset of transition. China had dismantled its legal system in the late 1950s 
and virtually started from scratch after 1978 (Zheng 1988). Russia was left with 
 socialist law from the past and basic reform legislation developed during the 
period of perestroika (Black, Kraakman, and Hay 1996; Pistor 1997). The entire 
body not only of corporate and securities, but also of contract, tort, and white 
collar criminal law had to be developed anew. The pace of legal reform in 
transition economies has been remarkable. Most countries put the relevant laws 
on the books within a decade after the beginning of transition (Pistor, Raiser, 
and Gelfer 2000).  
However, enacting law on the books is only the very first step in 
establishing an effective legal system. The incomplete law theory helps explain 
why this is the case. Because law is incomplete, its meaning and implication for 
a particular fact pattern cannot be easily derived from statutory law alone. Even 
when law is highly specific, new fact patterns raise new questions about how 
the law should be interpreted. Russian courts, for example, had to determine 
whether a legal provision that prohibits a director from transacting on behalf of 
the company he is representing with a company in which he holds a substantial 
stake, also applies when the director acquired the stake shortly after the 
transaction had been entered into. It is impossible to stipulate all the possible 
meanings and applications of the fiduciary duties a director or manager owes to 
the corporation. Any attempt to do so would leave key aspects unresolved. By 
using broad, ambiguous terms, lawmakers in essence invite law enforcers to 
give meaning to this provision when applying it to specific cases, or put 
differently, they allocate residual lawmaking powers to enforcement agents, 
 that is, courts and/or regulators. Conversely, attempts to clearly articulate 
actions that are considered violations of the law invite strategies to circumvent 
the law and require future lawmaking to avoid major gaps in the law from 
developing. Given the pace of financial market development, the propensity for 
gaps to develop is high, which results in deterrence failure. 
If law is incomplete neither individuals nor law enforcers can stipulate 
whether a particular action will fall within the scope of a law and will therefore 
face sanctions. To ensure compliance even with incomplete law, legal systems 
could increase the level of punishment. However, this might result in excessive 
punishment of harmless and potentially beneficial actions. Thus, law fails to 
deter optimally. Moreover, we suggest that the larger a financial market, the 
more serious the deterrence failure problem.2 The reason is that for any given 
punishment level, when market value increases the issuer’s benefits from 
cheating also increases. To deter cheating the level of punishment would have 
to be increased. But for any given incompleteness level of law, this would also 
increase the expected punishment of harmless actions. To avoid excessive 
punishment of such actions, the deterrence level is restrained.  
The combination of highly incomplete law, low levels of punishment 
relative to the level of incompleteness, and high market values may result in 
deterrence failure. The more incomplete the law, the greater the likelihood that 
deterrence occurs even when financial markets are still small. Given the level of 
incomplete law in transition economies, they are likely to suffer deterrence 
 failure at an earlier stage of financial market development than did countries 
with better-developed legal systems.  
In order to address the deterrence failure problem it may be advisable to 
introduce regulators. Regulators can enforce law ex ante by enjoining actions 
that have the potential of causing harm; they can establish entry barriers and use 
them to screen companies prior to listing. The efficacy of these regulatory tools, 
however, depends crucially on the quality of company specific information.3 In 
transition economies reliable company specific information is difficult to obtain 
and standard practices, such as disclosure of financial information may be more 
misleading than reflecting the true worth of a company. Financial information 
was created by translating existing accounts that followed socialist bookkeeping 
principles with no relation to market prices into accepted market based 
accounts. Chinese balance sheets to this day have double entries: one for the 
value of company assets according to legal accounting principles, which may be 
legal, but do not present the intrinsic value of the firm and another with re-
evaluation estimates, which may be closer to the actual market value, but 
remain guesswork in an environment where markets for many assets remain 
underdeveloped. Similarly, it has been pointed out that in transition economies 
financial accounts often do not reflect company practices, in part because of tax 
avoidance issues, in part because companies are struggling with how to record 
old debt or barter transactions (Bailey 1995). The information problem is 
 aggravated by the absence of reliable independent sources of information or 
experts. 
In this environment, proactive law enforcement by regulators cannot be 
effective. Under a disclosure rule, a regulator would require an issuer to reveal 
a set of standardized information. It would then use this information to perform 
a “smell test” (Coffee 1999), that is, to determine whether the public issue can 
go forward, or whether additional information should be requested. Once the 
additional information is revealed, the regulator decides whether the company 
may or may not go forward with the issuance. If the information that is 
submitted is noisy or manipulated the smell test and the final decision will have 
a large margin of error. To put it differently, in an environment where 
information is unreliable, a regulator lacks the necessary ingredient (reliable 
information) for effective proactive enforcement. The result is regulatory 
failure. Given the severity of the information problem, regulatory failure is 
likely to occur at a relatively early stage in financial market development. The 
result may be either the failure of markets to take off, or the collapse of a 
market after it reached a critical threshold where the incentives to cheat 
outweigh the enforcement ability of existing institutions given the constraints of 
highly incomplete law and severe information problems.  
 
Governing Financial Markets: The Experience of Russia and China 
 China and Russia embarked on policies designed to promote the development 
of financial markets in corporate securities in the early 1990s. There is evidence 
from China that already in the 1980s companies were searching for new ways 
to raise funds and many started to issue shares. Markets for shares sprung up 
spontaneously, but were later regulated out of existence (Zhu 2000). In Russia, 
commodity markets spearheaded the development of financial markets in the 
late 1980s, but it began in earnest only with the dissemination of privatization 
vouchers in 1991 and with the trading of corporate shares subsequent to 
privatization (Frye 1997).  
Although we acknowledge that factors other than law enforcement may 
have an impact on financial market development, research in recent years has 
pointed out the importance of law as a determinant of financial market 
development (La Porta et al. 1997). We generate several predictions from our 
theoretical analysis for the ability of these two transition economies to build 
effective governance structures for financial markets:  
 
• Given high levels of incomplete law in transition economies, a court regime 
will not be effective in deterring securities fraud. Courts will therefore play 
only a minor role in law enforcement at least during the initial phase of 
financial market development. 
 • Law enforcement by regulators is contingent on the quality of information 
regulators obtain from companies. Given the low quality of company 
information available from (former) state owned companies in transition 
economies and the lack of a well developed accounting and auditing 
profession, regulators will not be able to ensure effective law enforcement. 
• In the absence of effective law enforcement, financial market development 
will suffer from deterrence as well as regulatory failure, unless countries 
find ways to overcome the incomplete and/or the information problem.  
 
The Case of Russia 
We begin by describing Russia’s experience with establishing governing 
structures for financial markets. Russia’s experience fits more squarely the 
familiar pattern of law enforcement by courts cum regulators. Russia attempted 
to jump start financial market development by launching a mass privatization 
program in 1992, which created a nation of shareholders. All Russian citizens 
were given vouchers, which they could invest either directly or through an 
intermediary in the company of their choice. Over 15,000 companies were 
organized as open joint stock companies the shares of which were freely 
tradable (Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny 1995). It was hoped that the auction 
process would reveal company specific information, as voucher investors could 
chose among different companies. This proved to be unsuccessful, however, 
 because companies were not put on the auction block simultaneously. 
Moreover, investors from afar could obtain only very little information about 
companies. Although the government used a standard formula to describe the 
companies’ underlying assets, number of employees and financial status, the 
information revealed little about the potential of the company to survive in a 
competitive market environment. Not surprisingly, most voucher investors 
invested locally, often in the firms that employed them. Financial 
intermediaries, such as voucher investment funds, also had little trust in the 
financial information they obtained from the companies and invested in bribing 
company officials for better information (Frydman, Pistor, and Rapaczynski 
1996).  
Russia completed the mass privatization program in 1994. At that time, 
the commercial court system, the arbitrazh courts, were already functioning. 
The courts have handled securities disputes on a regular basis: 1834 cases in 
1997 and as many as 3483 in 1999, and 2403 in 2000. To be sure, these 
numbers include all disputes related to financial instruments and disputes 
involving corporate stock may only amount to a small fraction of these 
numbers. Nevertheless, the numbers do suggest that courts were functioning 
and issuing rulings on a fairly regular basis.  
In November 1994, President Yeltsin established the Federal 
Commission for Securities Market Regulation (FCSM) by presidential decree. 
It took two more years for a comprehensive securities law to be adopted by the 
 Russian parliament. This new law vested the FCSM with the right to oversee 
financial markets. Also in 1996, Russia’s first comprehensive corporate law 
was enacted. The corporate law was based on a draft written by leading 
American scholars in comparative corporate governance and draws heavily, 
though not exclusively, on US models (Black and Kraakman 1996). The two 
laws followed somewhat different strategies. The corporate law sought to 
strengthen shareholder rights, but avoided allocating strong lawmaking and law 
enforcement powers to courts. This was based on the assessment that Russian 
courts were slow, incompetent, and even corrupt (Black and Kraakman 1996). 
The drafters of the code attempted to circumvent courts by endowing 
shareholders with extensive self-enforcing rights, including extensive 
information and voting rights. This strategy was not successful, mostly because 
the so-called self-enforcing rights proved to be at best “self-help” rights, as 
shareholders were unable to enforce them against management. The Securities 
Law, by contrast, vested courts with the ultimate power to enforce the securities 
law. The newly created FCSM had the right to initiate enforcement procedures, 
but in order to impose fines or delist a company, it had to bring action in court. 
This strategy can be interpreted as a response to the legacy of powerful state 
agents who were feared to undermine rather than support market developments 
in the post socialist countries. Alternatively, it may reflect the ongoing power 
struggle between President Yeltsin who had established the FCSM by decree 
and staffed it with his followers on the one hand, and the Russian parliament 
 (State Duma), which was more skeptical about Yeltsin’s economic policies, on 
the other. In any case, the failure to endow the new regulator with independent 
enforcement powers undermined its efficacy. 
In response to continuing enforcement problems, the law enforcement 
powers of the FCSM were expanded by a presidential decree in 1996. Finally, 
an overhaul of the FCSM’s powers occurred in 1999 with the adoption of the 
Investor Protection Law, which took effect at the beginning of 2000.4 The new 
law allows the FCSM to fine companies that fail to comply with the provisions 
of the Securities Law or the Investor Protection Law for an amount of up to 
10,000 times the minimum wage without having to go through the courts. Fines 
may be imposed for violating registration requirements, among others, for 
failing to disclose relevant information and for disseminating misleading 
information. The FCSM may delegate enforcement authority to its branch 
offices in different parts of the country.  
As a result of these reforms, Russia today has a legal framework in 
place that resembles in many aspects US style securities regulation. Prior to 
issuing shares to the public, companies need to register with the FCSM and 
disclose relevant company information. Failure to do so can be punished by a 
regulator that has the legal power to enjoin actions, to fine, and to initiate court 
enforcement procedures. In addition, the FCSM makes rules and implements 
regulations to adapt to a changing market environment. Information on 
enforcement activities also suggests that Russia has made some headway in 
 establishing a reasonable legal framework for financial market development. In 
the first year after the enactment of the Investor Protection Law, the FCSM 
conducted 1318 enforcement proceedings; in 2001 there were over 6000.5 
Still, despite remarkable progress in developing a legal framework that 
resembles in large parts those in developed market economies, as of now this 
system has not contributed much to financial market development. Russia’s 
financial market collapsed in August 1998 as a result of the government’s 
default on its loans. In 2002 Russia had once again become a star performer 
among emerging markets. However, these results can largely be attributed to 
rising oil prices. Indeed, as of 1999, 73 percent of Russia’s total market 
capitalization was made up of companies in the oil, gas, and mining sectors, 
followed by utilities and telecommunications companies (IFC 2000). Moreover, 
there have been only few initial public share offerings, suggesting that firms are 
not using equity markets for external funds, or conversely, that investors have 
little appetite in parting with their money given the uncertainties they faced in 
obtaining a return on their investment. Finally, the stocks traded on Russian 
exchanges move overwhelmingly together. Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) have 
observed that stocks in emerging markets tend to move together, whereas stocks 
of different firms in developed market economies move more independently 
from each other. They suggest that the reason for this is the lack of firm-
specific information. Using the co-movement of stock as an indicator for firm-
specific information they find that countries range from co-movement of .03 in 
 the United States to close to .6. In most cases, co-movement declined over time. 
In Russia, the level of co-movement was .28 in 1995, increased to .46 in 1998, 
and reached a level of .37 in 2000.6 This suggests that the legal reforms have 
not enhanced the level of firm-specific information available to investors. Even 
leaving aside the data point for 1998, which is affected by the collapse of the 
financial market in that year, the level of co-movement in 2000 was still higher 
than in 1995. 
 
The Case of China 
The Chinese case differs in several important ways from the Russian case. In 
China, the privatization of state owned companies did not precede market 
development, but may now come at the end of a ten year process, which saw 
state owned enterprises being listed on stock exchanges and parts of their shares 
being traded by individual investors. Roughly 60–70 percent of company shares 
remained in state hands, with only 30–40 percent issued to private investors. In 
November 2002, the State Council issued regulations that allow foreign 
investors to acquire stakes held by various state agencies in listed companies. 
Rather than developing institutions from scratch, China used existing 
bureaucracies as initial regulators and monitors of financial markets. Only 
gradually were these institutions replaced with a newly established securities 
regulator. Although China has also created a remarkably developed legal 
infrastructure for financial markets over the past ten years, the markets have 
 been governed for most of this period by mechanisms, which are not strictly 
law enforcement mechanisms, and which we therefore call “beyond law 
enforcement.” Most importantly, China used a decentralized selection 
procedure for identifying companies that were to be listed and used a quota 
system to incentivize local agents to invest in the selection process.  
Regarding the development of the legal infrastructure for financial 
markets, we observe a proliferation of agencies and rules intercepted by several 
attempts to streamline and centralize the regulatory infrastructure. The People’s 
Bank of China (PBC) was designated as the key agent for financial market 
supervision in 1986 and retained this function officially until 1992. There is 
evidence that to this day, the PBC and its local branches take part in monitoring 
markets and ensuring law enforcement.7 In addition, the office of the state 
auditor has continued to monitor state owned enterprises, including those whose 
shares are traded on the exchange. At the regional level, the two major stock 
exchanges that emerged in 1990, Shanghai and Shenzhen, adopted listing rules 
and regulations. Over time, their powers were taken over by regulators at the 
central level. In fact, under the 1999 Securities Law, the stock exchanges seem 
to serve a function more akin to an agent of China’s Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), which has emerged as the major financial market 
regulator. 
In 1992, the State Council established the State Council Securities 
Commission (SCSC). The SCSC became an important body for developing 
 policies for financial markets, but did not become a full-blown regulator. This 
task was taken up by a second body created by the State Council in 1993, the 
CSRC. In 1998, the two agencies were merged into a single agency, the CSRC. 
The chairman of the CSRC is ex officio member of the State Council. Thus, 
there is no attempt to create an independent regulatory body. The CSRC was 
given some lawmaking power, and it issued listing requirements as early as 
1993. However, until the adoption of the Securities Law in 1999 and the 
strengthening of the CSRC through its merger with the SCSC, the State Council 
issued most of the path setting rules and policies that governed financial 
markets, including the 1993 regulations on the management of stock exchanges 
and securities fraud, and the 1995 adoption of B-share regulations. 
In 1994, China adopted the first company law at the national level. The 
law establishes detailed merit requirements for companies wishing to issue 
shares and to be listed at a stock exchange. A company must, among others, 
show that it has operated profitably for at least three years; that it has issued 
shares to the public; that at least 25 percent of these are in the hands of the 
general public; and that its registered capital exceeds RMB 400 million. In 
addition, the company needs approval from the relevant securities authority and 
the stock exchange, must use one of the specially licensed investment banks as 
underwriters, and can choose only from among especially licensed law firms to 
help them prepare the relevant work for share issuance and listing. In 1999, 
China’s first comprehensive securities law was enacted. It does not refer 
 directly to the CSRC, but to the State Council’s “authorized unit”, which is in 
charge of financial market supervision, and which is generally interpreted to be 
the CSRC. The law vests this unit with primary functions of market regulation, 
but also allows it to delegate decisions, including admission to trading, to the 
exchanges. Under the law, the CSRC may issue implementing regulations and 
has made extensive use of this authority. In February 2000, the CSRC issued 
new regulations for stock offerings; in March it decreed that for new companies 
share issuance would be spread over a 24 month period; in the same month it 
established new guidelines for assessing the creditworthiness of underwriters. 
Law enforcement activities by the institutions listed above have been 
rare when compared with Russia and in light of China’s much greater financial 
market development. Administrative sanctions enforced by the CSRC may take 
several forms, ranging from informal rebukes to a formal ruling. Data are 
available only for the latter. Between 1997 and the end of 2001, the CSRS 
published 205 formal rulings, including 15 for market manipulation, 2 for the 
dissemination of wrongful information, 9 for insider trading, 39 for violation of 
disclosure rules, 3 for listing on stock exchanges outside the People’s Republic 
of China without relevant approval, as well as for a number of violations related 
to the management of client accounts and the use of private accounts for 
speculating in shares (Pissler 2003). During this period there were more than 
900 companies listed on Chinese stock exchanges on average, more than four 
times as many as in Russia. 
 Until recently, law suits in securities matters have been virtually absent 
in China. Neither corporate nor the securities law gives investors explicit 
standing in court. Attempts by investors and their lawyers to bring class action 
suits were frustrated by a Supreme Court Ruling in September 2001.8 The 
opinion stated that courts did not have the competence to handle these cases at 
the time and that they would therefore not accept such cases. In January 2002, 
this ruling was modified by stating that in cases of companies issuing 
misleading information in a prospectus, a case may be heard by a court, 
provided that the CSRC has investigated the matter and effectively penalized 
the company.9 Finally, in January 2003, the Supreme Court issued a new 
guiding opinion, in which it lays down in great detail the conditions for investor 
suits.10 This decision has already triggered a new wave of litigation. However, 
how courts will handle these cases, and whether court enforcement will 
ultimately enhance the effectiveness of law enforcement remains to be seen. For 
the past ten years of China’s remarkable financial market development, these 
formal enforcement mechanisms have not played an important role.  
Looking only at the familiar framework for financial market regulation 
outlined above would therefore miss much of governance structure for the early 
period of financial market development in China. For a deeper understanding, 
one must take a look at measures beyond law enforcement. The most important 
governance structure for financial markets beyond law enforcement used in 
China in our view is the decentralized process of selecting companies that could 
 issue shares to the public combined with a quota system that created 
competition among the regions.11 We do not claim that the system was designed 
for the purposes we describe, but we suggest that it has fulfilled important 
functions where standard law enforcement mechanisms failed as a result of 
highly incomplete law and lack of reliable standardized information. Under the 
quota system, Beijing allocated to different provinces and/or ministries a stated 
amount in renminbi, the country’s currency, that companies owned by these 
agents could use for issuing shares to the public. There is little data available on 
how this process worked in practice; we rely on a detailed analysis of the early 
development of the Chinese capital market (Fang 1995) as well as on interviews 
with knowledgeable insiders. The total amount of capital made available to 
companies was apparently derived in consultation with the PBC. The bank 
sought to reduce lending to state-owned enterprises, and the amount by which it 
cut back its lending was replaced by options to raise equity funds. The 
distribution of these options--expressed in the value of renminbi allotted to 
different provinces and ministries--was the result of an intense internal 
bargaining process. Factors that were beneficial for a region were its size and 
economic importance, in particular past economic success, as well as the 
performance of companies that were already traded on the market. 
Once the amount was set, it was up to the provincial government, in 
collaboration with the company’s owners, including ministries, local branches 
of the PBC, and other state agents with a stake in the company, to identify the 
 company for listing and nominate it. In this process, companies were frequently 
“repackaged.” Valuable assets were separated by establishing a subsidiary and 
this subsidiary rather than the parent company would be nominated for listing 
(Oi and Walder 1999). Sometimes companies were merged, or assets from 
different companies were combined in a jointly owned entity that would then be 
put forward for listing. After the company was nominated by the province, the 
final decision was left to the CSRC. The CSRC frequently used delaying 
strategies rather than outright refusal in restricting access to the market. In 
taking such measures the CSRC was influenced not only by characteristics of a 
particular company and/or province but by concerns about the absorption 
capacity of the market. 
The most important aspect of the quota system in our view is that it 
triggered a process of decentralized information gathering by knowledgeable 
agents of the system at a time when it was impossible to standardize the 
information that might be relevant for investors, and when intermediaries were 
not available to verify or certify this information. The selection process helped 
to unearth information about companies. It thereby improved the information 
basis for those who had to assess the future potential of companies and to give 
them access to the market. Because the system involved the participation of 
various state agents, it ensured that it was sufficiently contested to reveal 
critical information. The relevant company information for making such 
decisions were not primarily financial reports about past performances, as past 
 performance was at best marginally based on market criteria. Instead, it 
involved a qualitative assessment of the company’s assets and management 
potential--that is, information that cannot be easily standardized.  
This positive interpretation of the quota system is contingent on the 
notion that provinces and ministries involved in the process of selecting 
companies had incentives to select better rather than worse companies. There is 
some evidence that the system worked to create such incentives. Substituting 
state credits with equity funds as such was not a guarantee that provinces and 
ministries would in fact invest in selecting viable companies for listing on the 
market. Indeed, provinces may have hoped to diversify the burden of loss 
making companies, and thus may have preferred to bring their lemons to the 
market (Akerlof and Romer 1993). However, the fact that identifiable state 
agencies were involved in the process of selecting companies also implied that 
they could be held responsible for bad decisions. On several occasions, regional 
governments were pressured to “take care of their children” and bail out loss-
making firms. Moreover, regional governors have increasingly come to see the 
performance of their regions as a stepping stone in their own political career. 
This prospect could be seriously harmed, if one of “their” companies went 
under. Finally, failure by companies from a particular region or ministry could 
deprive that region or ministry of future allocations of equity quotas. In sum, 
the quota system instilled some measure of competition into the system, which 
created incentives for investing in the selection process of companies. We do 
 not suggest that the system ensured that always the best companies were 
selected, but propose that it created disincentives for bringing the worst 
companies to the market and thereby considerably reduced the chances of 
creating a market for lemons. 
In 2000, China announced that it would move away from the quota 
system and that when determining to list a company, the CSRC would rely 
increasingly on listing requirements established in the company law, its own 
listing requirements, and information available in financial data that were 
certified by especially licensed intermediaries. However, because there were 
still many companies in line, which have been approved but not been able to 
issue shares, the shadow of the quota system remained for some time after it 
had been officially abandoned.  
The decentralized process of selecting companies without pre-
established criteria and transparent sources of information is obviously 
vulnerable to corruption. The negotiations among various state agencies are 
nonpublic and as such nontransparent, making monitoring difficult, if not 
impossible, and thereby reducing accountability. Apart from the minimum 
merit requirements established in the 1994 company law, which were 
effectively overruled by the quota system, clear criteria for selecting companies 
were absent, creating the appearance that the selection process was a rather 
murky undertaking. In fact, news reports suggest that the process frequently 
disfavored companies with less political influence but perhaps higher merits. 
 Still, the sanctions regions or ministries faced for bringing lemons to the market 
that would soon fail were sufficiently strong to avoid strategies that rested 
entirely on political bargains and not on economic merits. Moreover, each 
nomination of a company was the result of a multiparty bargain, which implied 
that the various parties kept an eye on how many private benefits their 
counterparts sought to extract from the bargain.  
 
Russia and China Compared 
On any standard measure of stock market performance, including the number of 
listed companies, market capitalization, and market turnover as a measure of 
liquidity (Levine and Zervos 1998), China outperforms Russia. As of January 
2002, there were over 1131 listed companies in China--up from 10 in 1990, and 
compared to 245 in Russia. Market capitalization as a percentage of GDP was 
at US$ 524 billion, whereas in Russia it stood at US$ 62.9 billion (Gao 2002). 
Market capitalization data have to be corrected for the stakes closely held by 
the state, which amounts to about 60 percent of total company shares. Note, 
however, that a similar correction would have to be made for Russian firms, as 
large blockholders, including state agencies or entities controled by the state, 
control on average over 50 percent of companies that are listed on the market. 
Finally, only few companies have attempted an initial public offering in Russia, 
or pursued a secondary offering after they were listed. Distortions in both 
markets may cast doubt on the extent to which these comparisons are 
 meaningful. However, even if we allow for substantial corrections, it is 
undeniable that in light of China’s much lower level of GDP--an indicator 
which has proved to be a powerful predictor of stock market development 
(Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler 2003)--the country’s strong financial 
market performance is quite remarkable.  
The most striking feature of China’s financial market development in 
light of the governance system described above is that the indicator for co-
movements of stock have decreased significantly from .31 in 1993 to .22 in 
2001 (Morck et al. 2000). Although this is still far above levels found in 
developed market economies, it is substantially lower than in Russia. This trend 
suggests that in China more firm-specific information is available to investors 
than in Russia.  
 
Beyond Law Enforcement 
We argue that China’s superior performance in financial market development 
had taken place not despite of, but because of, governance mechanisms beyond 
law enforcement. In this section, we tie the empirical analysis into our 
theoretical framework and seek to explain why what may appear to be 
interventionist measures, including quotas and merit rules, may be beneficial in 
an environment characterized by highly incomplete law and severe information 
problems. We use a stylized analysis of quotas, merit rules, and combination of 
quotas and merit rules to make our point. 
 In an environment characterized by information problems, too many 
companies with too little information may be entering the market at the same 
time. Establishing quotas to control market entry may help to contain that 
problem. An example of the use of quotas to control a new market is the 
creation of only 15 investment funds in the Polish privatization program, as 
compared to the over 400 funds that mushroomed in Russia and the Czech 
Republic in a market-driven process (Coffee 1999), which made it virtually 
impossible for regulators to enforce even the little regulation they had.  
Simple entry barriers in the form of quotas, however, do not 
discriminate between viable firms and lemons. This may be achieved by adding 
merit requirements, that is, substantive conditions a company must meet to be 
admitted to the market. Merit rules are based on the presumption that the 
conditions stipulated are indeed indicative of a company’s worth. They have 
been criticized because lawmakers or regulators may not have sufficient 
information to identify such indicators. This critique, however, presumes that 
investors have other sources of information. If they do not, then merit 
requirements, as crude as they are, may signal that companies are meeting some 
very basic conditions (such as profit making for the last several years) and 
thereby enhance investors’ confidence. 
The Chinese quota system goes substantially beyond a combined 
quota/merit rule. As discussed above, China did not simply impose a 
nationwide quota, but allocated subquotas to different regions. Quotas could 
 remain unused, be reduced or reallocated to different regions. In order to ensure 
that a province would have future access to stock markets as a potential source 
of funds for its companies, it had to be reasonably sure that these companies 
would perform. This required additional information gathering from company 
insiders. The process has been less transparent than a pure quota/merit system 
might have been. However, it fostered the collection of insider information that 
would have escaped simple merit rules. 
The success of this system in China during the early phases of stock 
market development does not imply that it would be superior to a disclosure 
system in the long term. Nor does it mean that it should be taken as a simple 
recipe for developing financial markets elsewhere. The quality of the 
information in terms of the investment prospects a particular company offered 
depended heavily on effective checks and balances to guard against misuse. We 
suggest that competition among regions and ministries and the possible bailout 
sanction have gone some way in ensuring that relevant state agents invested in 
the selection of more rather than less viable firms. However, the system has not 
been flawless, nor is it necessarily sustainable. There is evidence that once 
companies have made it to the market, the assets they represent are substituted 
for different assets in takeover transactions that resemble the acquisition of 
moribund chartered corporations in England at the time of the South Sea 
Bubble (Davies 1997). This process obviously undermines an elaborate 
information system that rests heavily on the identity of the corporation that is 
 screened prior to listing with the one that is ultimately traded. Other parts of the 
system create moral hazard problems. Most importantly, the fact that regions 
were forced to bail out their companies undermined the incentives for managers 
to perform at a level that would avoid failure, and created disincentives for 
investors to invest in assets that would generate positive returns. In fact, 
available evidence suggests that when companies come close to insolvency, 
their share prices increase. This suggests that the insurance function state 
ownership provides works pretty well, but also raises the specter of moral 
hazard problems in hardening the budget constraint for state owned enterprises.  
Yet, the system is not beyond reform. As mentioned, the quota system 
has already been phased out. Moreover, after several flawed attempts by the 
state to sell additional shares to the market, which were met by heavy selling 
and price declines, the latest attempt to reduce state ownership has taken the 
form of selling blocks to foreign investors. Whether China will successfully 
manage the transition from a financial market that depends heavily on state 
agents in selecting and insuring companies to one where market forces will 
have greater force remains yet to be seen. The comparison with the Russian 
case, however, suggests that there is no short cut to complex markets and that 
law enforcement mechanisms that have become standard in developed market 
economies may be dysfunctional when the task is to create markets and to 
govern this initial phase of market creation. 
 
 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations 
In this chapter, we have analyzed the development of governance structures for 
financial markets in transition economies, using China and Russia as examples. 
We argued that even in developed market economies with well developed legal 
systems, law enforcement in a sector that is as rapidly changing as financial 
markets are, is not an easy task. Socioeconomic and technological change 
renders laws that are designed to deter harmful actions highly incomplete. In 
order to ensure effective law enforcement, the legal system must allocate the 
right to adapt, interpret, and enforce the law to agents that are best capable of 
handling this task. We propose that when law is highly incomplete and harmful 
actions may cause substantial damages, allocating LMLEP to proactive law 
enforcers, such as regulators, may be superior to leaving it with courts that 
enforce the law only reactively. This result is based on the assumption that 
regulators have access to reliable information about companies, which means 
that accounting information is meaningful and can be verified by market 
watchdog institutions as well as law enforcement agents. 
In transition economies law is even more incomplete than in developed 
market economies, as most laws have only recently been enacted, and 
lawmaking and law enforcement agencies lack the experience to apply and 
interpret this law to a variety of newly emerging cases. Moreover, market 
watchdog institutions are lacking and reliable information is scarce. We suggest 
that under those conditions, imitating practices of developed economies, such as 
 simply shifting law enforcement from courts to regulators, is not sufficient. In 
the absence of reliable information a regulatory regime may fail to enhance 
social welfare, and may instead result in regulatory failure, triggering a collapse 
of financial markets. We conclude that standard mechanisms of law 
enforcement may not work effectively during the early period of market 
development.  
The diagnosis of these problems and the acknowledgement of the likely 
failure of standard recipes do not immediately translate into positive policy 
recommendations. What should be clear from our analysis, however, is that 
transition economies cannot simply rely on either court or regulatory law 
enforcement. The incentives to cheat are simply too great as highly incomplete 
law and severe information problems render law enforcement by courts and 
regulators ineffective. In order to avoid deterrence and regulatory failure, 
transition economies should move beyond law enforcement. This implies 
greater involvement of state actors in selecting companies and setting 
conditions for companies to access the market, which raises concerns about 
possible misuse of these powers. Any transfer of additional power to 
government agents should therefore be accompanied by governance 
mechanisms that minimize the misuse of power and that create incentives for 
state agents to make decisions that maximize social welfare, not their own 
personal interests. 
 We suggest that China has devised a system that accommodates most of 
these concerns. The decentralized selection process of companies, which relied 
heavily on state agents with insider information has revealed more critical 
company information than would otherwise be available. At the same time, the 
quota system and the likely repercussions state agents faced for making bad 
decisions created incentives for these agents to invest in the selection process 
and avoid a race to the bottom. A major drawback of the system is that it relied 
on continuous state ownership. Only this gave state agents access to company 
information and ensured that they aligned their interests with those of the 
companies. Yet, state ownership has created its own moral hazard problems. 
The ultimate success or failure of the Chinese strategy will therefore depend on 
whether a transition from dominant state ownership to dominant private 
ownership can be engineered without major disruptions in financial market 
development. Yet, the official cancellation of the quota system, the continuous 
development of merit and disclosure rules, and more recently, the enactment of 
legislation that allows foreigners to buy shares in companies give hope that the 
system is already reforming itself. 
Whether Russia would have been able to follow a similar strategy as 
China is questionable. Certainly after most major companies had been 
privatized--a measure that was designed to cut the umbilical cord between state 
agents and enterprises--the China model was no longer an option. Yet, Russia 
could have used rigid merit requirements to select companies for listing. 
 Instead, Russia based its regulatory system primarily on disclosure. Even the 
stock exchanges shied away from merit-based listing standards as they feared 
that companies would move to different exchanges if they introduced entry 
requirements in the form of merit rules. Given the lack of reliable company 
information, a disclosure system could not work effectively in Russia. The 
FCSM has finally realized this and introduced listing requirements, which are 
applicable to all exchanges in 2002.  
A more general lesson of our analysis is that whatever may have 
emerged as “best practice” in developed market economies, may be 
dysfunctional in an environment with very different characteristics. Even if the 
medium to long-term goal is to converge on such practice, at the outset of 
reforms other means may have to be pursued to initiate market development. 
This is likely to imply greater involvement by state agents, which in turn 
requires governance institutions that minimize the abuse of such power. The 
Chinese example suggests that a combination of collective decision making and 
competition between different decision-making units may control these costs to 
some extent. By contrast, the Western model of powerful state agents with 
strong decision-making powers subject only to judicial review may be difficult 
to implement when courts are not very effective and a culture of law abidance 
has not been developed. 
A further policy implication of this analysis is that the success of 
economic reforms depends on the ability of systems to respond effectively to 
 new challenges that arise and to change and adapt the system over time. In 
China, this process of experimentation, trial and error, has been the hallmark of 
economic reforms over the past thirty years. In this process, Chinese state 
agents have learnt the art of adaptation and responsiveness to change. In Russia, 
by contrast, the attempt to shift the economy and economic institutions rapidly 
to a market based economy along Western models, has preempted a process of 
gradual adaptation and change and cut short the learning process that goes 
along with it. The result has been a system that is dysfunctional because initial 
conditions in Russia were incompatible with the model chosen for financial 
market development, and because the process of institution building neglected 
the need for future self-correction of the system. 
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1 In Xu and Pistor (2003) we develop a formal game theoretical model with four 
players: a lawmaker, a law enforcer (either a court or regulator), a share issuer, 
and an investor. The game has two periods and models the impact of 
lawmaking and law enforcement by courts or regulators on the propensity of 
share issuers to take actions that may result in damages to investors. There is 
information asymmetry between the share issuer and the other players. The 
share issuer has incentives to cheat, which may result in losses suffered by the 
investor. The law is designed to punish cheating. We show that when law is 
complete at equilibrium law enforcement by courts achieves the first best, that 
is, law will effectively deter. This is consistent with the model developed by 
Becker (1968). However, when law is incomplete, at equilibrium, deterrence 
failure occurs. The comparative static of the model shows that the more 
incomplete the law, the more serious the deterrence failure. 
                                                                                                                                   
2 In our formal model (Xu and Pistor 2003), we demonstrate the trade-off 
between courts and regulators using simulation analysis to show that when the 
market has reached a certain threshold, the incentives of the investor to cheat 
are sufficiently large to result in deterrence failure. The higher the level of 
incompleteness of the law, the earlier this threshold is reached, and the earlier a 
market crash occurs as a result of deterrence failure. 
3 In our formal model, a regulator may enjoin an action temporarily and request 
additional information before making a final decision as to whether the issuing 
of shares my go forward or not. The information obtained upon request is 
critical for making the right decision. In absence of reliable information, a 
regulator may either enjoin potentially beneficial actions or fail to enjoin those 
that are likely to cause harm. For details see Xu and Pistor 2003. 
4 Law No. 46 on the Protection of Investors Rights of March 1999. 
5 Information published in various issues of the official gazette of the Russian 
Supreme Arbitrazh Court. 
6 These data have been kindly made available by Bernard Yeung.  
7 In fact, according to the Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
People’s Bank of China passed on March 18, 1995, one of the functions of the 
bank is the supervision of financial markets. On several occasions, the PBC has 
participated in the promulgation of sanctions by the CSRC against violators of 
financial market regulation. 
                                                                                                                                   
8 People’s Supreme Court Notice on the Temporary Suspension on the Hearing 
of Securities Related Civil Compensation Cases of September 21, 2001. 
9 Decisions of China’s Supreme Court of January 15, 2002. 
10 Decision of January 10, 2003. 
11 Other means, including the retention of large blocks of shares by the state are 
more problematic for reasons further explained below. 
